

# Container Corporation | REDUCE

## Pricing pressure and market share concerns continue

CCRI is expected to be the key beneficiary of the modal shift from road to rail with full commissioning of the WDFC. However, we think WDFC-implied modal shifts are exaggerated as EXIM containers at JNPT are increasingly being transported along non-WDFC corridors (East and South aligned). Further, pricing aggression by well-funded peers is likely to weigh on near-term pricing, EXIM margin and market share. We downgrade to REDUCE on the stock with a TP of INR 500. Our TP implies 14x FY28 EV EBITDA.

- **WDFC to connect to JNPT by end-FY26 but large-scale rail modal shift may be limited:** The WDFC (Western Dedicated Freight Corridor) is already connected to Mundra and Pipavav but road to rail modal shift has failed to materialise. This is due to increased presence of short lead traffic and rising trucking competitiveness following increased capex on highways/expressways infrastructure. In case of JNPT, the modal shift may be limited to 22-24% by rail (vs. 16% in FY25) and not 30-35% as generally believed. This is due to increasing shift of EXIM container traffic towards Nagpur, Hyderabad and North Karnataka belt, which reduces the share of north-bound or WDFC-aligned traffic to 33%. Similarly, a significant share of the traffic to Gujarat is short lead and is unlikely to shift to rail. JNPT port capacity is constrained at 10mnTEU p.a. and with FY26 volume likely to cross 8mnTEU there is limited headroom for further absolute growth.
- **Aggressive pricing actions by certain CTOs is impacting market share and pricing:** We have witnessed some losses in EXIM market share at Mundra due to aggressive pricing offered by well-funded peers like Adani Logistics and DP World. This behaviour may likely persist as ADSEZ and DPW focus on integrated end mile logistics. This dynamic is not only impacting pricing and margins but also necessitating investments into trucking (low margin) for CCRI to support first mile last mile (FMLM) logistics to retain market share.
- **Management initiatives are positive but industry trends are unfavourable:** CCRI has managed to substantially rationalise costs. It has largely maintained employee costs at steady levels and has also kept land licence fee (LLF) cost under control by surrendering land at rail controlled ICDs where operations are sub-optimal. However, trends like levying of 10% busy season surcharge since FY25 at a time of moderate diesel prices (leading to relatively steady truck freights) has impacted competitiveness. The focus on FMLM capex is necessary but is margin dilutive.
- **Valuations have corrected but lacks near-term triggers, downgrade to REDUCE with DCF-based TP of INR 500:** CCRI appears inexpensive below 25x FY27 PE on Bloomberg consensus estimates. However, this can be misleading as it appears Street numbers do not yet bake in the full extent of pricing aggression. While connection of JNPT to WDFC can provide some near-term support sentimentally (thus providing an exit opportunity), it is unlikely to translate into strong EBITDA growth over FY26-30E due to limited nature of modal shift.

Financial Summary					(INR mn)
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Net Sales	86,325	88,634	91,671	1,04,123	1,14,329
Sales Growth (%)	6.5	2.7	3.4	13.6	9.8
EBITDA	19,296	18,986	18,929	22,548	24,588
EBITDA Margin (%)	22.4	21.4	20.6	21.7	21.5
Adjusted Net Profit	12,362	12,969	12,525	15,535	17,506
Diluted EPS (INR)	20.3	21.3	16.4	20.4	23.0
Diluted EPS Growth (%)	5.7	4.9	-22.7	24.0	12.7
ROIC (%)	14.3	13.6	12.6	15.4	16.7
ROE (%)	10.7	10.7	9.9	11.6	12.2
P/E (x)	27.1	25.8	33.4	27.0	23.9
P/B (x)	2.8	2.7	3.2	3.0	2.8
EV/EBITDA (x)	20.0	20.2	20.0	16.5	14.9
Dividend Yield (%)	2.0	2.1	1.6	2.0	2.3

Source: Company data, JM Financial. Note: Valuations as of 22/Sep/2025



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### Recommendation and Price Target

Current Reco.	REDUCE
Previous Reco.	HOLD
Current Price Target (12M)	500
Upside/(Downside)	-9.1%
Previous Price Target	508
Change	-1.5%

### Key Data – CCRI IN

Current Market Price	INR550
Market cap (bn)	INR419.0/US\$4.7
Free Float	48%
Shares in issue (mn)	761.6
Diluted share (mn)	761.6
3-mon avg daily val (mn)	INR791.0/US\$9.0
52-week range	742/481
Sensex/Nifty	82,160/25,202
INR/US\$	88.3

### Price Performance

%	1M	6M	12M
Absolute	0.4	-0.3	-23.0
Relative*	-0.6	-6.7	-20.4

\* To the BSE Sensex

JM Financial Research is also available on: Bloomberg - JMFR <GO>, FactSet, LSEG and S&P Capital IQ.

Please see Appendix I at the end of this report for Important Disclosures and Disclaimers and Research Analyst Certification.

## Limited WDFC benefits and pricing aggression by peers pose growth and margin challenges


Loss of market share is a concern; corrective measures are underway

Sector liberalisation hurt CCRI's market share; normalcy since FY15

In FY06, the Ministry of Railways (MoR) opened rail container transport for private participation. Prior to this policy, CCRI, as a part of the Ministry, was the sole national container train operator (CTO). As the sector opened up for private participation, a number of private operators applied for the CTO licence, which led to sharp volume market-share erosion for CCRI.


However, the drop in market share has largely been arrested since FY15 at 65-70% for export import (EXIM) volume. Post this period, a significant number of CTOs practically ceased to operate due to their small scale of operations (hence lower profitability) and presumed preferential access to CCRI for railway terminals. While some of the new entrants adopted an aggressive pricing strategy, it was largely limited to container volume destined for short lead distances, hence having lower margins. With limited price aggression in long lead volumes, CCRI faced relatively minimal impact on EBITDA margin (sustained at 23-26% over FY15-20), despite the reduction in volume market share.

**Exhibit 1. CCRI has lost market share to private CTOs**



Source: Company, JM Financial

**Exhibit 2. Aggressive pricing is impacting margins**



Source: Company, JM Financial


### However, strong challenge is emerging as large port operators are investing in backward integration

Since FY20, there has been a significant ramp-up in container train operations by Adani Logistics (100% owned subsidiary of ADSEZ) with steady increase in container rakes operated (18 rakes in FY18 to 132 rakes in FY25) with eventual target of 300 rakes by FY29. Adani Logistics is also investing heavily in trucking and aims to expand its truck fleet from ~900 in FY25 to ~5,000 by FY29 to boost first mile last mile (FMLM) logistics. Similarly, DP World with its presence in the key ports of Mundra and JNPT is also expanding its footprint through a combination of acquisitions (KRIBCHO).

We find that most port operators are well funded and are focusing on FMLM-integrated logistics. They are also able to offer competitive pricing on long lead distances, which is CCRI's most profitable segment. As per our estimate, private CTOs' discount on long leads is as high as 9%, compared with CCRI's pricing. This, coupled with a more reliable service level, aided by strong FMLM, is pushing up the market share of peers, at the expense of CCRI.


More recently, we are observing the entry of JSW INFRA in the space with the acquisition of Navkar and Arshiya, providing it presence both in the northern and western parts of India. The investments by well-funded peers into backward integration is likely to intensify competition in our view.

**Exhibit 3. CCRI lost market share to CTOs like Adani Logistics**



Source: Company, JM Financial

**Exhibit 4. CCRI dominates but ADSEZ is adding rail rakes**



Source: Company, JM Financial

**Exhibit 5. CCRI tariffs at key northern routes are higher than those of ADSEZ**


**ADSEZ vs. CCRI railway haulage charges**

Rail haulage charges	INR/TEU	INR/NTKM
ADSEZ	34,729	1.87
CCRI	35,600	1.97
Base charge of Indian railways	21,629	1.16
<b>Total charges</b>	<b>INR/TEU</b>	<b>INR/NTKM</b>
ADSEZ	47,662	2.56
CCRI	50,655	2.80
Indian railways	31,033	1.67
<b>% difference CCRI vs ADSEZ</b>		<b>9.3%</b>

Source: Industry, JM Financial

**Management thrust on end mile logistics (trucking) can arrest market share loss but can also be a drag on margins**

We feel the management's delayed response to developing FMLM connections, across CCRI's terminal network (64 as of FY23), is one of the key reasons for market share loss. CCRI's FMLM coverage, i.e., share of originating volume having FMLM facilities was only 23% in FY23. We believe it was weaker in FY22, when only 35 of 61 terminals had FMLM facilities, as CCRI had not yet invested in a trucking fleet or technology. However, in Oct'23, following the elevation of Mr Sanjay Swarup as the CMD, the company witnessed a change with focus on end mile logistics and software. The current CMD has a target of increasing CCRI's FMLM share to 80% by FY27 (currently 35% at end-1QFY26 with 5% contribution to revenue). While the focus on FMLM is welcome, trucking margin is 3-4% vs. 20-25% at CCRI level.

**Exhibit 6. First mile last mile share is rising but still away from target of 80% by FY27**

Source: Company, JM Financial

CCRI is also investing in LNG trucks and bunkering facilities at its terminals (ICDs) as well as in software apps to improve service delivery. The two terminals selected for app-based tracking have shown promising results and the management has plans for a wider rollout. These actions are addressing two emerging megatrends in customer demand, in our view.


- **Provide integrated logistics solutions, with high service delivery levels:** We note that CCRI's pricing is higher than peers, including Adani Logistics. However, in rail transport, we find that service levels are more important than pricing, especially for cargo destined for longer leads (average value of consignment per twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) is USD 60,000 vs. USD 300-400/TEU for rail transport). We also note that CCRI has wider network coverage than any other CTO, including Adani Logistics. Based on management commentary, CCRI now aims to focus on higher service levels, while maintaining premium pricing.
- **Green logistics (reduced emissions):** This is being addressed by deploying LNG trucks and using renewable energy at terminals to operate equipment. So far (till FY25), 130 LNG powered trucks have been deployed and a further 200 are being procured.

**Resultant pricing and margin challenges may continue in the near term**

CCRI's realisation on unit EXIM volume handled or even on originating volume has been relatively stagnant since FY21. This highlights the severe pricing pressure the CTO industry is facing both as a result of competitive pricing by integrated port companies and also due to improved competitiveness of trucking following levy of 10% busy season surcharge since 2HFY24.


To the management's credit, it has largely kept employee cost in check (reflected in robust productivity levels) and also kept LLF in check at ~INR 4.0bn p.a. through a series of rationalisations of terminals located on Indian Railways land with minimal volume sacrificed in the process.

Exhibit 7. Realisation has weakened in recent quarters



Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 8. EXIM margin is weaker than pre-Covid levels



Source: Company, JM Financial

### Indian Railways' tariff hike of 10% may pose a near-term challenge

**Rail freight is a key cost, but largely not in CCRI's control; customer preference is a function of rail vs. road competitiveness**


The Indian Railways has implemented sharp tariff hikes in the past that coincided with periods of lower or stable diesel prices. This led to modal share gradually shifting from rail to roads. Though CCRI was able to maintain its market share within CTO operators, the overall rail CTO market growth was sluggish.

Indian Railways decided to levy a busy season surcharge of 10% (w.e.f. 1<sup>st</sup> Oct'23). This came at a time when diesel prices were relatively stable. To stay competitive vs. road, CCRI was able to undertake a 7% tariff hike in EXIM cargo initially and a lower hike on domestic cargo. This tariff hike covers the rise in rail freight expenses and is unlikely to be margin accretive, in our view. We note that this tariff hike came after a gap of ~5 years. However, due to **aggressive CTO competition the 7% tariff increase could not be absorbed by the market, which impacted EXIM margins in FY25 and also in 1QFY26.**

CCRI's revenue is largely derived from rail freight income, with some smaller contributions from road freight income (possibly a result of FMLM), storage and warehousing. Thus, except for rail haulage, there are limited levers to control margins from an income point of view. In the case of cost items, rail freight expense payable to Indian Railways (for track access charges) is the largest item, and it is not in CCRI's control (rail tariffs are set by Indian Railways, which is a public monopoly).


**CCRI is focusing on key areas of costs that are in its control, namely, employee cost rationalisation, increased double stacking** (the upper stack rail fare is 50% of the lower stack; thus, double stacking reduces costs by 25%) and maintaining LLF at relatively unchanged levels.

Exhibit 9. Rail freight and handling key drivers of revenue



Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 10. Opex driven by rail freight expenses and LLF




Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 11. Indian Railways undertook abrupt fare hikes in FY15 but recent hikes in FY19 and FY24 were moderate

Leads (kms)		Freight rate		(INR/TEU)		Change (INR/TEU)			% increase		
		FY13	FY15	2HFY19	2HFY24	FY15	2HFY19	2HFY24	FY15	2HFY19	2HFY24
701 - 750		9,983	12,620	13,251	14,576	2,637	631	1,325	26.4%	5.0%	10.0%
751 - 800		10,611	13,418	14,089	15,498	2,807	671	1,409	26.5%	5.0%	10.0%
801 - 850		11,240	14,216	14,927	16,420	2,976	711	1,493	26.5%	5.0%	10.0%
851 - 900		11,868	15,014	15,765	17,342	3,146	751	1,577	26.5%	5.0%	10.0%
901 - 950		12,496	15,812	16,603	18,263	3,316	791	1,660	26.5%	5.0%	10.0%
951 - 1000		13,125	16,610	17,441	19,185	3,485	831	1,744	26.6%	5.0%	10.0%


Source: Industry, JM Financial

Exhibit 12. LLF (land licence fees) has been steady




Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 13. Employee cost also largely under check




Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 14. Gross margin (ex LLF) has been steady



Source: Company, JM Financial

Exhibit 15. Improved double stacking drives up asset turns




Source: Company, JM Financial

### Deep-dive into our volume projections on CCRI (detailed WDFC modelling)


#### We estimate 11% EXIM CAGR over FY25-28E partly supported by JNPT linkage to WDFC

Based on our deep-dive of WDFC rail container traffic, we arrive at 11% EXIM container volume CAGR over FY25-28E for CCRI. For our analysis, we have projected potential EXIM rail volume for CCRI based on potential rail EXIM container volume on the WDFC route by port (by FY30) and CCRI's market share at key ports. We list key conclusions from our analysis below:


- **Port-based analysis suggests 6% CAGR in port container volume over FY25-28E:** We have considered the key gateway ports on the West Coast, namely Mundra, Pipavav and JNPT, as well as smaller volumes at other terminals, namely Kandla and Mumbai, for our analysis. We estimate c7% CAGR in Mundra, which contributes the highest share in volume growth (in absolute terms). We also estimate that JNPT will largely exhaust its full permitted capacity of 10mnTEU by FY30E (vs. 7.3mnTEU in FY25). We factor in the rise in volume at Kandla terminal (DP World), which would add further capacity at the port (2.15mnTEU).
- **WDFC supports ~12% CAGR over FY25-28E driven by modal shift:** Mundra and Pipavav are already connected to the WDFC, and we expect them to benefit initially. However, the shifts have so far been relatively modest since a significant part of the traffic is short lead (according to GPPV) with volume concentration rising in Gujarat and Rajasthan. We also expect JNPT to connect to WDFC in end-FY26 and rail modal share to rise from 16% in FY25 to 24% by FY30E. JNPT's modal share gains are limited by bulk of the traffic falling outside WDFC zones. These factors enable rail modal share to rise from 21% in FY25 to 27% in FY30E.
- **Expect CCRI to lose market share but witness 11% EXIM container volume CAGR over FY25-28E:** We expect Adani Logistics to gain market share in the Mundra region till FY27. Post FY26 and with the connection of JNPT to WDFC, CCRI's market share is likely to stabilise. The market share loss in Mundra zone supports a lower but still decent 11% CAGR in EXIM container volume over FY25-28E.

**Exhibit 16. Port-wise container origin (mnTEU)**


Source: Company, JM Financial, Industry

**Exhibit 17. Share of rail evacuation on West Coast containers**

Source: Company, JM Financial, Industry

**Exhibit 18. Port-wise rail evacuated containers (mnTEU)**

Source: Company, Industry, JM Financial

**Exhibit 19. CCRI EXIM volume by ports (mnTEU)**

Source: Company, Industry, JM Financial


### Limitations on rail shift at JNPT as cargoes are not aligned to WDFC

We note that there is a popular misconception that rail freight is cheaper than road freight. While a cursory glance at road and rail tariffs might suggest this, it must be noted that trucking can support door-to-door delivery, while rail traffic needs additional handling and FMLM logistics. We estimate the breakeven distance to be ~500-750km.

### Low lead traffic (<400km) may not shift to rail despite DFC

We estimate that ~40% of the containers are for low lead distances (based on National Rail Plan 2030). These cargoes will be hard to shift from road to rail without indulging in aggressive tariff cuts, in our view. This holds true for both Mundra and JNPT, which have relatively well-developed hinterlands in Gujarat and Maharashtra (except in Pipavav, with a less-industrialised hinterland).



**Exhibit 20. Railways is cheaper than roads only for long leads (including FMLM costs)**

Source: Industry, JM Financial


**JNPT hinterland is oriented away from the WDFC**

A study by The Energy and Resources Institute (TERI) in 2019 highlighted that shippers prefer rail container movement for import containers. This is because fully loaded containers are being unloaded at ports and these containers need to be sent to ICDs. However, exporters tend to transport smaller quantum of goods by road to ICDs, near the port premises, for aggregation and then containerisation for final exports.


This leads to a significant mismatch between import and export legs, resulting in empty running charges for CTOs. Even with the commissioning of DFCs, effecting the shift in export containers (~40% of traffic) will be challenging, in our view.

Furthermore, for JNPT, unlike Gujarat ports, a significant portion of the hinterland is not aligned to the WDFC (Central and eastern Maharashtra, Hyderabad, and Bangalore). Based on our hinterland study and estimates, only 33% of the container volumes are north-bound long leads (the rest are for local consumption in Maharashtra and South India). This aligns with statements by CCRI management that 30-35% of demand from JNPT is in the northern region. For non-WDFC aligned cargo, we do not expect any modal shift as the railway's competitiveness is impacted by the development of high-quality roads (Mumbai Nagpur Expressway). Therefore, we estimate only ~24% rail coefficient for JNPT in the long term (FY30).

Furthermore, JNPT has no further scope of expansion (current capacity of 10.0m TEU). Unless the planned Vadhavan port is implemented, which we believe is at least a decade away, the Maharashtra WDFC zone area is likely to be saturated in terms of port capacity by FY29E.

**Exhibit 21. JNPT hinterland analysis: Majority of traffic is along the non-WDFC route**

Source: Industry, JM Financial

**Exhibit 22. Rail modal share can rise up to 25% by FY30 vs 16% (FY25) even if rail volume doubles on WDFC stretch**

Source: Industry, JM Financial

### Peers are investing in ICDs along the WDFC, rail rakes and FMLM capabilities

Key CTO operators, such as Adani Logistics, are investing in ICDs along the WDFC. Other CTOs including Pristine Logistics, Gateways Distriparks, DP World, JM Baxi and Hind Terminals have also invested in setting up ICDs in the region (these terminals are mostly targeted on the Mundra to Dadri routes) along the WDFC

On the JNPT leg, Adani Logistics acquired Navkar's ICD at Tumb (Gujarat), which is linked to the WDFC. JSW has acquired Navkar's assets and is likely to roll out full-fledged CTO operations. **All this implies incremental competition for CCRI.**


CCRI has key ICDs in the zone, namely Swarupgunj and Varanama. Currently, JNPT's cargoes are being aggregated at Varanama, before being transitioned on the WDFC.

Key peers have increasingly invested in rail rakes for container train operations and in expanding their trucking fleet (owned or leased) to support their FMLM capabilities and act as integrated logistics players.

**Exhibit 23. Companies are increasing their presence along the WDFC**

Adani Logistics	DP World	Pristine ICD/PFT	Gateway Distriparks	Hind Terminals	JM Baxi
Patil Haryana	Modinagar	Kanpur (UP)	Gurugram Garhi Harsaru	Kila Raipur, Ludhiana	Delhi ICD
Kila Raipur, Ludhiana	Panipat	Ludhiana (Punjab)	Ludhiana Sahnewal	Palwal Logistics Parks	Incchapuri ICD
Kannech, Rajasthan	Hindaun	Patna (Bihar)	Faridabad Piyala		
ICD Tumb	Pali	Siliguri (West Bengal)	Ahmedaad Viramgam		
Malur, Bangalore	Ahmedabad	Birgunj (Nepal)	Kashipur		
Borkehdi, Nagpur	Khazira	SICAL (Bangalore)			
ICD Loni	Hyderabad				
ICD Valvada					
Virochnagar MMLP					

Source: Industry, JM Financial.

**Exhibit 24. CCRI still retains the lion's share in container rakes**

Source: Company, Industry, JM Financial

**Estimate 9% EBITDA and 11% PAT CAGR over FY25-28E**

We estimate 9%/11% CAGR EBITDA/EPs for CCRI over FY25-28E. We are 10%/8% lower than consensus estimates on our FY26/27 EBITDA estimates. We believe the consensus estimates do not factor in headwinds on pricing and margins from aggressive competition.

**Exhibit 25. JMFe vs. consensus**

INR m	JMFe		Consensus		JMFe vs consensus	
	FY26E	FY27E	FY26E	FY27E	FY26E	FY27E
Sales	91,671	1,04,123	96,878	1,10,554	-5.4%	-5.8%
EBITDA	18,929	22,548	21,105	24,477	-10.3%	-7.9%
EBITDA margin (%)	20.6%	21.7%	21.8%	22.1%	-114bps	-48bps
PAT	12,525	15,535	14,406	16,902	-13.1%	-8.1%

Source: Company, Industry, JM Financial

**DCF-based target price of INR 500, downgrade to REDUCE**

We value CCRI's core business using DCF methodology. Based on CCRI's current operations, we arrive at a value of INR 500. For our DCF valuation, we use a risk-free rate of 6.6% (in line with India's G-sec yield), an equity beta of 0.9x and a terminal growth rate of 5%. Thus, we downgrade to REDUCE rating.

**Exhibit 26. DCF based TP of INR 500**

Parameters	Value
Cost of equity	11.10%
Risk free rate	6.6%
Market premium	5.00%
Adjusted Beta	0.90
Terminal growth	5.0%
NPV of FCFF	3,39,213
Cash on books (FY26E)	41,029
Equity value	3,80,242
<b>Target price</b>	<b>500</b>

Source: JM Financial

## Investment risks

### Upside risks


- Market-share gains in the near term and volume benefits from the full commissioning of the WDFC
- Railway tariff rationalisation and predictability supporting modal shift from road to rail
- Lower-than-estimated LLF levels in the event more terminals are surrendered with minimal impact on cargo volumes

### Downside risks

- Further market share loss to private CTOs due to pricing aggression and expansion into integrated logistics services by other private players
- Continued delay (beyond FY26) in the connection of JNPT to the WDFC
- Sharp decline in truck freight rates or sharp tariff hike by railways adversely impacting modal shift from road to rail

## Annexures

## Exhibit 27. Map showing CCRI terminal locations



Source: Niti Aayog

## Exhibit 28. Port-wise ICD connectivity


Port terminal	Draft (m)	Capacity (mn TEU)	ICDs
Mundra			
CT1 (MICT)	16.50	1.35	Khodiyar-Sachana-Sanand-Tughlakabd-Patparganj-Dadri-Ghari, Harsaru-Loni-Patli-Piyala-Moradabad-Faridabad- Kahthuwass- Pantnagar-Sonipat-Samalkha-Ludhiana-(Dhandarikalan, Sahnewal, Kanesch Chawa)- Kashipur-Pali-Kota-Jaipur-Jodhpur (Bgkyt, Thar Dry port)- Rewari-Palwal
CT2 (AMCT)	14.00	1.20	
CT3 (AICT-MSD)	16.60	2.80	
CT4 (ACMT-CMA-CGM)	14.50	1.30	
Pipavav			
Maersk terminal	14.50	1.30	Sachana-Khodiyar-Sanand-Tughlakabad-Patparganj-Dadri-Ghari Harsaru-Loni-Patli-Piyala-Faridabad-Kathuwas-Sonipat-Samalkha-Bawal-Sudhiana (Dhandharikalan, Sahnewal, Kanech, Chawa) Kashipur-Pali-Jaipur-Jodhpur (BGKT, Thar Dry Port)
Hazira Adani			
AHCT	14.00	1.20	Tumb, Dashrath

Source: Industry, JM Financial


**Exhibit 29. Mundra and Pipavav have stronger rail connectivity to northern hinterland vs. JNPT**

	Mode	Train weekly frequency			Haulage time in days		
		Mundra	JNPT	Pipavav	Mundra	JNPT	Pipavav
Tughlakabad	Rail	14	7	7	3	3	3
Ludhiana (5 ICDs)	Rail	14	4	7	4	4	4
Dadri	Rail	14	7	7	3	3	3
Khodiyar	Rail	7	3	4	2	2	2
Samalkha (panipat)	Rail	7		1	3		3
Garhi Harsaru	Rail	3	1	1	3	3	3
Patli	Rail	4		1	3		3
ACTL Faridabad	Rail	3	1	3	3	3	3
MIHAN	Rail		4			2	
Piyala	Rail	7	1	2	3	3	3
Sanand	Rail	3		1	2		2
Jaipur	Rail	3	1	1	3	3	3
Hyderabad	Rail		7			3	
Patparhanj	Rail	7	1	1	3	3	3
Borkhedi	Rail		3			2	
Kanpur	Rail		3			3	3
Sonipat	Rail	7		2	3		3
Jodhpur	Rail	3		1	3		3
Moradabad	Rail	4	1	1	3	3	
Panki	Rail		4			3	
TIHI	Rail		3			2	

Source: Industry, JM Financial

**Exhibit 30. CCRI 12 month forward P/E is higher than average**

Source: Bloomberg

**Exhibit 31. CCRI's 12 month forward EV EBITDA is marginally higher than average**

Source: Bloomberg

**Exhibit 32. JMFe vs Consensus**

Particulars (INR mn)	JMFe			Consensus			JMFe vs consensus		
	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Sales	91,671	1,04,123	1,14,329	97,050	1,11,457	1,26,151	-5.5%	-6.6%	-9.4%
EBITDA	18,929	22,548	24,588	20,651	24,032	28,617	-8.3%	-6.2%	-14.1%
EBITDA margin (%)	20.6%	21.7%	21.5%	21.3%	21.6%	22.7%	-63bps	9bps	-118bps
PAT	12,525	15,535	17,506	14,005	16,882	29,781	-10.6%	-8.0%	NA

Source: JM Financial, Bloomberg

**Exhibit 33. Change in estimates**

Particulars (INR mn)	New			Old			Change in estimates		
	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Sales	91,671	1,04,123	1,14,329	91,671	1,04,520	1,16,182	0.0%	-0.4%	-1.6%
EBITDA	18,929	22,548	24,588	18,889	22,395	25,384	0.2%	0.7%	-3.1%
EBITDA margin (%)	20.6%	21.7%	21.5%	20.6%	21.4%	21.8%	4bps	23bps	-34bps
PAT	12,525	15,535	17,506	12,495	15,416	18,110	0.2%	0.8%	-3.3%

Source: JM Financial

## Financial Tables (Standalone)

Income Statement					(INR mn)
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Net Sales	86,325	88,634	91,671	1,04,123	1,14,329
Sales Growth	6.5%	2.7%	3.4%	13.6%	9.8%
Other Operating Income	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total Revenue</b>	<b>86,325</b>	<b>88,634</b>	<b>91,671</b>	<b>1,04,123</b>	<b>1,14,329</b>
Cost of Goods Sold/Op. Exp	59,817	61,723	64,372	72,890	80,730
Personnel Cost	4,628	4,889	5,182	5,337	5,497
Other Expenses	2,584	3,036	3,188	3,348	3,515
<b>EBITDA</b>	<b>19,296</b>	<b>18,986</b>	<b>18,929</b>	<b>22,548</b>	<b>24,588</b>
EBITDA Margin	22.4%	21.4%	20.6%	21.7%	21.5%
EBITDA Growth	4.8%	-1.6%	-0.3%	19.1%	9.0%
Depn. & Amort.	6,009	5,628	6,207	6,428	6,629
EBIT	13,287	13,357	12,722	16,120	17,959
Other Income	3,783	4,652	4,663	5,283	6,076
Finance Cost	653	695	664	664	664
PBT before Excep. & Forex	16,416	17,314	16,721	20,738	23,371
Excep. & Forex Inc./Loss(-)	-71	-333	0	0	0
PBT	16,345	16,981	16,721	20,738	23,371
Taxes	4,037	4,261	4,196	5,204	5,864
Extraordinary Inc./Loss(-)	0	0	0	0	0
Assoc. Profit/Min. Int.(-)	0	0	0	0	0
Reported Net Profit	12,308	12,720	12,525	15,535	17,506
<b>Adjusted Net Profit</b>	<b>12,362</b>	<b>12,969</b>	<b>12,525</b>	<b>15,535</b>	<b>17,506</b>
Net Margin	14.3%	14.6%	13.7%	14.9%	15.3%
Diluted Share Cap. (mn)	609.3	609.3	761.6	761.6	761.6
<b>Diluted EPS (INR)</b>	<b>20.3</b>	<b>21.3</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>20.4</b>	<b>23.0</b>
Diluted EPS Growth	5.7%	4.9%	-22.7%	24.0%	12.7%
Total Dividend + Tax	6,702	7,007	6,900	8,557	9,644
Dividend Per Share (INR)	11.0	11.5	9.1	11.2	12.7

Source: Company, JM Financial

Cash Flow Statement					(INR mn)
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Profit before Tax	12,308	12,720	12,525	15,535	17,506
Depn. & Amort.	6,009	5,628	6,207	6,428	6,629
Net Interest Exp. / Inc. (-)	653	695	664	664	664
Inc (-) / Dec in WCap.	-1,946	-846	-66	-191	-280
Others	-3,332	-1,545	-4,663	-5,283	-6,076
Taxes Paid	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Operating Cash Flow</b>	<b>13,692</b>	<b>16,652</b>	<b>14,668</b>	<b>17,153</b>	<b>18,444</b>
Capex	-7,817	-8,380	-8,600	-8,600	-8,600
Free Cash Flow	5,875	8,272	6,068	8,553	9,844
Inc (-) / Dec in Investments	0	0	0	0	0
Others	985	2,367	4,663	5,283	6,076
<b>Investing Cash Flow</b>	<b>-6,832</b>	<b>-6,014</b>	<b>-3,937</b>	<b>-3,317</b>	<b>-2,524</b>
Inc / Dec (-) in Capital	0	0	0	0	0
Dividend + Tax thereon	-6,702	-7,311	-5,760	-7,144	-8,050
Inc / Dec (-) in Loans	592	-112	0	0	0
Others	-1,936	-1,664	-664	-664	-664
<b>Financing Cash Flow</b>	<b>-8,047</b>	<b>-9,088</b>	<b>-6,424</b>	<b>-7,808</b>	<b>-8,715</b>
<b>Inc / Dec (-) in Cash</b>	<b>-1,187</b>	<b>1,551</b>	<b>4,307</b>	<b>6,028</b>	<b>7,205</b>
Opening Cash Balance	3,085	1,898	3,449	7,755	13,784
Closing Cash Balance	1,898	3,449	7,755	13,784	20,989

Source: Company, JM Financial

Balance Sheet					(INR mn)
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Shareholders' Fund	1,18,123	1,23,495	1,30,260	1,38,651	1,48,108
Share Capital	3,047	3,047	3,047	3,047	3,047
Reserves & Surplus	1,15,077	1,20,448	1,27,214	1,35,605	1,45,061
Preference Share Capital	0	0	0	0	0
Minority Interest	0	0	0	0	0
Total Loans	0	0	0	0	0
Def. Tax Liab. / Assets (-)	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total - Equity &amp; Liab.</b>	<b>1,18,123</b>	<b>1,23,495</b>	<b>1,30,260</b>	<b>1,38,651</b>	<b>1,48,108</b>
Net Fixed Assets	66,128	71,536	73,929	76,101	78,072
Gross Fixed Assets	98,089	1,09,017	1,17,617	1,26,217	1,34,817
Intangible Assets	169	124	124	124	124
Less: Depn. & Amort.	40,911	46,064	52,272	58,700	65,328
Capital WIP	8,782	8,460	8,460	8,460	8,460
Investments	13,336	13,336	13,336	13,336	13,336
Current Assets	59,185	57,923	62,366	68,787	76,567
Inventories	499	497	512	556	620
Sundry Debtors	3,295	3,944	4,064	4,413	4,924
Cash & Bank Balances	32,389	35,622	39,929	45,957	53,162
Loans & Advances	155	162	162	162	162
Other Current Assets	22,848	17,700	17,700	17,700	17,700
Current Liab. & Prov.	20,526	19,300	19,370	19,572	19,867
Current Liabilities	10,247	8,972	9,042	9,244	9,539
Provisions & Others	10,279	10,328	10,328	10,328	10,328
Net Current Assets	38,659	38,623	42,996	49,215	56,700
<b>Total - Assets</b>	<b>1,18,123</b>	<b>1,23,495</b>	<b>1,30,260</b>	<b>1,38,651</b>	<b>1,48,108</b>

Source: Company, JM Financial

Dupont Analysis					
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
Net Margin	14.3%	14.6%	13.7%	14.9%	15.3%
Asset Turnover (x)	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8
Leverage Factor (x)	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
RoE	10.7%	10.7%	9.9%	11.6%	12.2%

Key Ratios					
Y/E March	FY24A	FY25A	FY26E	FY27E	FY28E
BV/Share (INR)	193.9	202.7	171.0	182.0	194.5
ROIC	14.3%	13.6%	12.6%	15.4%	16.7%
ROE	10.7%	10.7%	9.9%	11.6%	12.2%
Net Debt/Equity (x)	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.3	-0.4
P/E (x)	27.1	25.8	33.4	27.0	23.9
P/B (x)	2.8	2.7	3.2	3.0	2.8
EV/EBITDA (x)	20.0	20.2	20.0	16.5	14.9
EV/Sales (x)	4.5	4.3	4.1	3.6	3.2
Debtor days	14	16	16	15	16
Inventory days	2	2	2	2	2
Creditor days	16	12	12	11	12


Source: Company, JM Financial



## History of Recommendation and Target Price

Date	Recommendation	Target Price	% Chg.
11-Aug-20	Hold	336	
21-Sep-20	Buy	376	11.9
7-Nov-20	Buy	380	1.1
8-Jan-21	Buy	424	11.6
5-Feb-21	Buy	456	7.5
5-Apr-21	Buy	520	14.0
24-May-21	Buy	592	13.8
30-Jul-21	Buy	632	6.8
22-Oct-21	Buy	640	1.3
22-Jan-22	Buy	688	7.5
20-May-22	Buy	616	-10.5
8-Sep-22	Buy	688	11.7
11-Nov-22	Buy	688	0.0
24-Jan-23	Buy	656	-4.7
19-May-23	Buy	616	-6.1
12-Aug-23	Buy	600	-2.6
4-Nov-23	Buy	648	8.0
26-Jan-24	Buy	720	11.1
19-May-24	Buy	896	24.4
7-Aug-25	Hold	508	-43.3

## Recommendation History



## APPENDIX I

## JM Financial Institutional Securities Limited

Corporate Identity Number: U67100MH2017PLC296081

Member of BSE Ltd. and National Stock Exchange of India Ltd.

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New Rating System: Definition of ratings	
Rating	Meaning
BUY	Expected return $\geq$ 15% over the next twelve months.
ADD	Expected return $\geq$ 5% and $<$ 15% over the next twelve months.
REDUCE	Expected return $\geq$ -10% and $<$ 5% over the next twelve months.
SELL	Expected return $<$ -10% over the next twelve months.

Previous Rating System: Definition of ratings	
Rating	Meaning
BUY	Total expected returns of more than 10% for stocks with market capitalisation in excess of INR 200 billion and REITs* and more than 15% for all other stocks, over the next twelve months. Total expected return includes dividend yields.
HOLD	Price expected to move in the range of 10% downside to 10% upside from the current market price for stocks with market capitalisation in excess of INR 200 billion and REITs* and in the range of 10% downside to 15% upside from the current market price for all other stocks, over the next twelve months.
SELL	Price expected to move downwards by more than 10% from the current market price over the next twelve months.

\* REITs refers to Real Estate Investment Trusts.

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